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COMMENT
WASHINGTON'S ALIEN LAND LAW-ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The law,' currently extant in Washington, denying aliens who have
not declared their intention in good faith to become citizens of the
United States the right to own land, and the constitutional provision2
to the same effect have their beginnings in prejudice and mob violence.
Although the modern application of the law has been directed almost
solely at the Japanese residents of the state, at its inception it was
probably aimed at the Chinese.
In the 1860's and 70's many Chinese laborers were imported into
this area to work in the gold mining industry.' When the gold mining
boom ended they found work at menial tasks unacceptable to the bulk
of the white population. However, in the mid-1880's work on the
Canadian and Northern Pacific railroads came to an end and many
whites were without jobs. The serious unemployment among whites
caused them to desire the once disagreeable jobs held by the Chinese.
The white unemployed worker looked upon the three thousand work-
ing Chinese as a threat of "cheap foreign labor." The uneasy situation
came to a head of violence in the anti-Chinese riots of 1885-86.
Primarily active in the incitement of anti-Chinese sentiment were the
labor organizations, as well as some business men and professional
people. The trouble became so serious that eventually federal troops
had to be brought in to keep the peace. With the arrival of federal
troops and the dismissal of many Chinese, the crisis abated."
However, in December, 1885, those people who wished to be rid of
the remaining Chinese procured the introduction of several anti-
1 RCW 64.16.010-.150. For previous discussions of the Alien Land Law see the
following: Cross, Alien Ownership of Corporations (Washington Legislation-1955),
30 WASH. L. REv. 195 (1955) ; Cross, Alien Land Law (Washington Legislation-
1953), 28 WASH. L. REy. 178 (1953); Note, 24 WASH. L. Rxv. 162 (1949); Note,
8 WASH. L. REv. 131 (1933); Note, 6 WASH. L. REv. 127 (1930). McKinlay, The
Washington Fisheries Code of 1949; Constitutionality of Discriminatory Provisions,
24 WASH. L. REv. 274 (1949). This article dealt with a law, passed in 1949, that
barred non-declarant aliens from obtaining a commercial fishing license (Ch. 112, 1949
Session Laws, § 63). This law was later amended to remove the bar against non-
declarant aliens; see RCW 75.28.020.
2 WASH. CONST. art. I § 33.
8AVERY, HiSTORY AND GOVEIUMENT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 197 (1961).
4 Id. at 199.
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Chinese bills in the territorial legislature. These bills were designed to
prevent Chinese from holding land, from operating laundries, and
from being hired for employment. On their face the bills were directed
at those "ineligible for citizenship."' Under the federal law of the
time, orientals, in general, could not become citizens of the United
States. The anti-Chinese element also sought to have Congress pass
any laws that might be needed to validate the proposed territorial
laws.
The territorial legislature did pass the land law, but the others
failed, primarily because it was felt that they would probably be
unconstitutional.' Thus, Washington has its first alien land law. It
was a law designed not only to restrict the entry of Chinese into the
state, but also to force out those already here. By the end of 1886
the agitation against the Chinese appears to have ended, but the
law remained on the books.'
The next step in the current law's development occurred when the
state constitutional convention of 1889 adopted a provision prohibiting
the ownership of land by those aliens who had not declared their
intention, in good faith, to become citizens of the United States.' It is
not patently clear that the constitutional provision was aimed at any
particular racial group, though doubtless many of the delegates who
voted for it had the anti-Chinese riots of three years past in mind.
There were those in the committee discussing the provision who
attacked it because it was reminiscent of the anti-Chinese legislation
of earlier years.9 The supporters of the provision did not single out
the Chinese experience as the motivation behind the provision; but
instead, they spoke in general terms, such as, "protect American land
for Americans."'" One Irish member of the committee harked back
to British land ownership in Ireland as an example of the supposed
5 Id. at 198.
6 Id. at 199. It should be noted that this was not the first attempt to procure leg-
islation aimed at restricting the Chinese. Apparently sentiment had built up against the
Chinese at an earlier date. Gov. William Pickering, in a message delivered to the l1th
annual session of the Legislative Assembly, on December 23, 1863, made the following
recommendation, "The large number of Chinese who have collected in several of the
mining regions on the Pacific coast, in some instances almost to the exclusion of our
own citizens, is a source of serious complaint. I would recommend that some protective
measures be adopted by the legislature to abate or remove the evil complained of."
Messages of the Governors of the Territory of Washington to the Legislative As-
seinbly, 1854-1889, in 12 UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PUBLICATION IN THE SOCIALSCIENCES, 115 (1940).
AVERY. op. cit. supra note 3, at 199.
8
WASH. CO NST. art. II, § 33.
9 THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION-1889,
551 (1962). 10 Ibid.
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dangers of alien land ownership. Another supporter saw it as a means
to protect the institutions of the state."
It is likely that any anti-Chinese sentiment held by the delegates
would not appear on the surface. The eyes of the nation, as well as
those of Congress, were on this constitutional convention. It is doubt-
ful that the delegates would have wanted the nation aware of a
racially discriminatory provision in a state constitution that would
later have to be approved by the President.
About the time the Chinese population in the state levelled off the
Japanese began to move in. Japanese immigration into the state had
its beginnings around 1878, when it is reported that approximately
thirty-four were working in the Puget Sound area. About 1890 a few
Japanese had begun to operate their own businesses. However, it was
only around 1900 that the Japanese had become a noticeable group in
the area."
It does not seem that the early immigration of the Japanese drew
any noticeable degree of animosity. One writer comments that the
whites, during the early period, were pleased to have the "little
orientals" provide small services for them. The paucity of Japanese
in the area during the Chinese riots doubtless accounts for the fact
that there was no organized baiting of the Japanese. Yet, the Japanese
probably shared the lot of the Chinese when feeling ran high against
the latter group as most occidentals probably did not distinguish be-
tween the Chinese and Japanese.
In view of their small numbers, and the nature of the work they
were engaged in prior to 1900, it cannot be said that the Japanese
constituted a pressure on the available lands of the state. The Jap-
anese population in Washington in 1900 was 5,617, it rose to 12,929
in 1910, and just before passage of the 1923 Alien Land law it was
17,387.14
The exact number of land-owning Japanese farmers just before
passage of the land law is not known. One report says,
In 1920, there were over a thousand cultivators on 25,000 acres; the
product was valued at nearly $4,000,000. They were the owners of
11 Ibid. For a discussion of the mood of the time, and the "Populist!' movement's
effect on alien land laws see: Sullivan, Alien Land Laws-A Reevaluation, 36 TEMP.
L.Q. 15, 31 (1962). See note 94 supra.
12 Miyamoto, Social Solidarity Among the Japanese in Seattle, in 11 UNImsrTrY
OF WASHINGTON PUBLICATIONS IN THE SocIAL SCIENcES 64 (1939)
1s Ibid.
1 4 ICHIHASHI, THE JAPANESE IN THE UN= STATES 166 (1932).
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3,500 dairy cattle, which supplied approximately one-half of Seattle's
milk requirements, and nearly three fourths of the small fruits and
vegetables consumed in the larger cities. They accounted for nearly
10% of the total state production of milk, soft fruits and vegetables
that year.15
Despite their relatively few numbers, when viewed in relation to
the white population of the state, the Japanese, through his skill and
effort, had won an important place for himself in the agricultural
market. Doubtless this eminence was one of the major factors in the
passage of the land law.
Japanese immigration into the state of California was causing a
considerable amount of trouble. When the Japanese in that state also
had won an important position for themselves in the state's agriculture,
and bigots were having a field day. Because of delicate relations with
Japan, President Roosevelt made numerous efforts to dissuade the
state from enacting restrictive legislation against the Japanese. 6 These
efforts in the long run failed and, in 1921, California added the
finishing touches to a very comprehensive law aimed at Japanese land
holdings." The Attorney-General of California announced to the
world that the avowed purpose of the legislation was not only to
discourage immigration of Japanese into the state, but to drive those
already there out." It is probable that the agitation in California
against the Japanese was echoed in the other western states. 9 Wash-
ington had the second largest Japanese colony in the nation,2" and
during that period, similar restrictive legislation was enacted through-
out the west." The people of Washington may have felt that the
harsh law in California would drive the Japanese out, and they were
hoping, by passage of the law, to dissuade mass immigration into this
state.
15Id. at 167. 6 Id.Ch. XV. 17 d. Ch. XVII.
Is This proposition was announced by the then Attorney General of California,
Ulyses S. Webb, in a speech before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on
August 9, 1913. See ICHIHASHI, op. cit. supra note 14, at 275.
19 The nature of this agitation is best illustrated by the following quote from
MCWILLIAMS, PREJUDICE, 60 (1944). "In point of virulence, the 1920 agitation far
exceeded any similar demonstration in California. In support of the initiative measures,
the American Legion exhibited a motion picture throughout the state entitled 'Shadows
of the West'! All the charges ever made against the Japanese were enacted in this
film. The film showed a mysterious room fitted with wireless aparatus by which 'a
head Japanese ticked out prices which controlled a state wide vegetable market'; spies
darted in and out of the scenes, Japanese were shown dumping vegetables into the
harbor to maintain high prices; two white girls were abducted by a group of Japanese
men only to be rescued, at the last moment, by a squad of American Legionaires."
20 ICHIHASHI, op. cit. supra note 14, at 166.
21 For a survey of the various alien land laws in the U.S. see SULLIVAN Op. Cit.
supra note 11.
[VOL. 39
THE ALIEN LAND LAW
One cannot tell how effective the law was in driving the Japanese
out of Washington by restricting their ownership of land.2 Numerous
ways were found to avoid the law. The corporation proved a useful
tool for the Japanese. Because the original law with respect to alien
owned corporations could be avoided only by the use of two corpora-
tions, it is difficult to say how much land was held via the corporate
device. On writer points out that a Japanese community association
formed a corporation under the "trusteeship of some white lawyers,
and under its name ... some 800 acres... (were bought up) which it
redistributed among Japanese farmers who had lost possession of
their land."2
Although the Japanese that were in Washington stayed on for the
most part, immigration into the state dwindled after passage of the
land law. Before enactment of the land law there were 17,387 Jap-
anese in the state, ten years later in 1930 there 17,837; the population
had increased by only 450."' Thus, the territorial laws, originally
aimed at the Chinese, evolved into a useful tool for accomplishing the
social and economic aims of those groups who felt imposed upon by
the Japanese.
The effectiveness of the law with respect to the Japanese came to
an end in 1953 with the passage of the McCarran immigration act
which removed the bar to Japanese eligibility for citizenship. From
that point on they could declare their intent, in good faith, to become
citizens.25
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WASHINGTON'S ALIENS LAND LAW
In the last two general elections the voters of the state of Wash-
ington have refused to repeal the constitutional provision prohibiting
the ownership of land by non-declarant aliens. Consequently, there
has been renewed interest in the law's validity, under the United States
Constitution, among those who desire the removal of this soiled page
from the state's history. Although the Supreme Court specifically
upheld the Washington Alien Land Law in 1923,26 recent cases
indicate that the law may be vulnerable to constitutional attack.
In 1923 the Supreme Court was called upon to invalidate the
22 One writer stated, "(T)he state anti-alien land laws have been unusually effective
as applied to the Japanese because the latter are living in countries where the district
attorneys have the reputation for being keen to investigate any alleged infractions."
MEARS, RESMENT ORIENTALS ON THE AmCAN PACIFIC COAST 259 (1928).
23 MiXAmoTo, op. cit. supra note 12, at 115.
24 IcHIrHASEI, op. cit. srupra note 14, at 166.
25 8 U.S.C. §§ 1422, 1101 (1952). 2 6 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
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California" and Washington Alien Land Laws as being repugnant to
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In the
four cases, decided the same day, the two state laws were unqualifiedly
upheld. Of the four, the leading case was Terrace v. Thompson,8
which involved the Washington law.
In Terrace, a white citizen sought to lease land to a Japanese alien
residing in the State of Washington. Under Washington law, an alien
who had not declared, in good faith, his intention of becoming a citizen
could not enter into a lease of the real property involved. Nakatsuka,
the potential lessee, could not make such a good faith declaration
because under the applicable Federal law at that date, Japanese were
not eligible for naturalization. The potential lessee and lessor sued to
enjoin enforcement of the law, alleging that they were being denied
property and liberty without due process of law and that Nakatsuka,
the alien, was being denied the equal protection of the law.2"
The court, harking back to the traditional common law view that a
state could bar an alien from holding land within its borders,"° found
little difficulty in disposing of the due process allegation. The court
probably regarded an alien's ability to hold land as a privilege, granted
by the states in abrogation of the traditional common law view. There-
fore, the alien's privilege to hold land could be revoked by the state
without infringing on the due process clause. This proposition was
summed up as follows: "State legislation applying alike and equally
to all aliens, withholding from them the right to own land, cannot be
said to be capricious or to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty
or property, or to transgress the due process clause."'"
When dealing with the alleged denial of equal protection the court
looked for a reasonable purpose to be accomplished by the state's law,
27 Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225
(1923) ; Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923).
28263 U.S. 197 (1923).
29 The parties also argued that the Washington law interfered with a treaty in force
between the United States and Japan concerning the rights and privileges of aliens of
each signatory in the territory of the other. The court decided that there was no
conflict between the state law and the treaty. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 211,
222 (1923).
30 For a discussion of the rights of an alien to hold land in feudal times, and at
common law, and a discussion of the early American cases see, KoNVTz, THE ALIEN
AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW, Ch. 5 (1946). For a criticism of the court's use
of early authority on the disability of aliens to hold land in the United States see,
McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35
CALIF. L. REV. 7, 38-42 (1947).
31 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 218 (1923).
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and then determined whether or not the classification used was ration-
ally related to that purpose. Little difficulty was encountered in
identifying a rational purpose. The court assumed that ownership of
land by aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens
might pose a danger to the welfare of the state.2 This proposition had
its birth in feudal times, when land tenure carried with it certain duties
to the state.3" However, the court did not specify the dangers that the
state might reasonably fear from ownership of land by aliens.
The petitioners argued that there was no rational basis to the classi-
fication employed by the state because it sought only to bar those
ineligible for citizenship, in this case the Japanese.34 The court recog-
nized that the statute acted against those ineligible for citizenship
when it described the restricted class as consisting of, "[A]liens who
may, and who intend to, become citizens... ."'I Instead of recognizing
the class as one designed to accomplish a discriminatory purpose, the
court upheld the classification on the basis that it was one created by
Congress. It was held that the state could reasonably rely on a class
created by Congress in the exercise of its plenary power over immigra-
tion and naturalization. In declaring certain groups of aliens ineligible,
the Congress created a class which the state might use for the applica-
tion of its alien land law. The court said: "The state may properly
assume that the considerations upon which Congress made such classi-
fication are substantial and reasonable." 6
The views expressed by the court in Terrace v. Tkompson were
deemed controlling when the California law was placed before the
court. The California law defined the class who could not hold land as,
those aliens ineligible for citizenship. It was a more narrowly defined
class than that created by the Washington law, but fitted neatly into
the reasoning of the court in Terrace. In the three cases decided on
the California law it was held constitutional to deny aliens the right
to acquire an interest in real property,"7 the right to farm land under
3
2 Id. at 220.
3 3 See KONVITZ, Op. cit. supra note 30 at 148. In feudal times the holding of land
carried with it certain obligations to superior lords. Among these obligations was the
duty to perform military service. For obvious reasons, an alien would not always be a
desireable soldier in the Lord's army. Furthermore, because of the duty the alien owed
to his own sovereign, he would be incapable of swearing fealty to his lord. Thus, the
alien was regarded as a misfit, best segregated with his own kind, not at all suited to fit
into a society whose basis was the ownership of land.
34 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 218 (1923).
35 Id. at 219.
36 Ibid. See discussion in text at note 59 infra for a criticism of this argument.
37 Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, (1923).
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a share-cropping agreement 8 and the right to own stock in a corpora-
tion authorized to take title to real property."
The land law cases did no violence to the then existent pattern of
Supreme Court decisions on the rights of aliens under the fourteenth
amendment. Although the alien was nominally cloaked with the
protection of the amendment,4" it was inconsistently applied with
regard to his rights. Ostensibly the alien had the same right to due
process and equal protection as the citizen; the concept was generally
accepted, but its application did not conform to the spirit of the
amendment. Time and again the alien was allowed to be rationally
considered as suspect.
In Clarke v. Deckebach,41 the city of Cincinnatti was allowed to bar
aliens from the operation of pool rooms. The court took judicial notice
of the fact that pool rooms had "dangerous tendencies,"" and there-
fore, the city had a valid objective in attempting to control these
tendencies. The court was not willing to say that aliens were as fit
as citizens to operate such a dangerous business; they deferred to the
city council's judgment.4 This implied that it was reasonable to as-
sume that aliens might cause more trouble in the operation of pool
rooms than citizens. Thus, a mild form of xenophobia had been given
judicial sanction.
Other restrictions on alien activity were upheld. It was considered
constitutional to withhold liquor licenses from them,44 to bar them from
being ship's pilots, 5 to bar them from working for the state46 or hunt-
ing the state's game. The alien was very much the "stranger in our
midst." Nevertheless, there were limits as to how far a state could
go in discriminating against the alien. He could not be barred from
following ordinary modes of gainful employment,48 he could not be
taxed solely on the basis of his alien status,49 and he could not be
38 Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923).
39 Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923).
40 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The court interpreted the fourteenth
amendment to apply to all "persons" within a state's territorial jurisdiction, thus aliens
being persons were given the protection of the amendment.
41274 U.S. 392 (1927).
42 Id. at 397.
43 Ibid.
44 Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 Atl. 905 (1890).
45 State v. Ames, 47 Wash. 328, 92 Pac. 137 (1907).
46 Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915). See: Powell, The Right to Work for the
State, 16 COL. L. REv. 99 (1916).
47 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
48 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
49 Ex Parte Kotta, 187 Cal. 27, 200 Pac. 957 (1921).
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barred from following the occupations of a peddler,5" barber,51 or
laundryman.
52
Because of the fine distinctions used to determine that which an
alien could and could not do, the alien had a hard time determining
that which he had a constitutional right to do, and that which he did
not. One proposition was clearly established, however, classification
on the basis of alienage could be "rational" in many situations.
Recent cases decided by the Supreme Court indicate that the spirit
of the fourteenth amendment will probably be more strictly applied in
cases involving aliens. Two cases decided by the Supreme Court in
1948"8 lead to speculation that the Washington land law might now
be considered unconstitutional. These cases may have worked a major
change on the line of decisions allowing alienage to be a rational basis
for classification.
In Oyama v. California" the Supreme Court was called upon to set
aside an escheat proceeding against a Japanese under the California
alien land law. The decision of the court struck down one provision
of the California law, thereby reversing the state supreme court;
however, the rest of the law was left intact. But, the opinion, by no
means, reaffirmed the earlier land law cases, it merely avoided decision
on the argument that the entire law was invalid.5  There were, how-
ever, two concurring opinions, subscribed to by four of the eight
Justices sitting,"8 that would have reversed on the grounds that the
entire land law was unconstitutional.
By and large the concurring opinions viewed the California law as
one primarily directed at Japanese aliens, and as such a discrimination
based solely on race. The court was not unmindful of the history of
the law. Mr. Justice Black stated,
"If there is any one purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment that is
wholly outside the realm of doubt, it is that the Amendment was
designed to bar states from denying to some groups, on account of
5o State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 AUt. 165 (1900) ; contra. Commonwealth v.
Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907).
51 Templar v. Board of Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N.W. 1058 (1902).
52Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
03 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n. 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. State of
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
54332 U.S. 633 (1948).
5r Id. at 647.
56 Eight justices participated in the decision of the court. Mr. Justice Vinson deliv-
ered the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Black, with Mr. Justice Douglas, delievered
a separate concurring opinion, and Mr. Justice Murphy, with Justice Rutledge deliv-
ered another concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Reed, with Mr. Justice Burton, dissented.
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their race or color, any rights, privileges, and opportunities accorded
to other groups.
'57
Mr. Justice Murphy stated in his concurring opinion: "I believe that
the prior decisions of this court giving sanction to this attempt to
legalize racism should be overruled." '58 Thus, four Justices viewed
the California law as a racist statute and sought to overrule Terrace
v. Thompson and the California land law cases on that basis.
Mr. Justice Murphy attacked the proposition expressed in Terrace
v. Thompson that a state may rely on a classification created by an
act of Congress to accomplish its purposes." The classification created
by Congress to accomplish objectives within its power is not neces-
sarily constitutional when employed by a state. The state may use
the classification for different ends, and in a different setting. The
considerations that supported one do not necessarily carry over into
the new usage and setting. Therefore, Mr. Justice Murphy pointed
out that the state's classification had to stand on its own feet when
attacked; it could not rely for constitutional validity on the fact that
the class was created by Congress. "[I] f a state wishes to borrow a
federal classification, it must seek to rationalize the adopted distinction
in the new setting.""0
Mr. Justice Black further argued for the law's invalidity on the
grounds that it interfered with a right granted by Congress.6' Although
the Japanese aliens were barred from citizenship, they were, never-
the less, granted the right to enter and reside in this country. There-
fore, California could not seek to discourage their entry into, and
continued residence in that state without thereby constricting the
right granted by Congress. In granting an alien the permission to
enter this country, Congress has allowed that alien to move freely
within the nation, and live where he will. The alien land laws seek to
prevent the entrance of the undesired alien. Therefore, the land law
causes an unconstitutional conflict with the supreme, valid act of
Congress. This argument, presented by Mr. Justice Black, later
57 Oyama v. State of California, 322 U.S. 633, 649 (1948) (concurring opinion).
58 Id. at 672 (concurring opinion).
59 See text at note 36 supra.
60 Oyama v. State of California, 322 U.S. 633, 664 (1948) (concurring opinion).
61 Id. at 649-650 (concurring opinion). Interestingly, Mr. Justice Black also stated
that the California law interfered with the policy obligations assumed by the United
States when it became a signatory to the United Nations Charter. The Charter pro-
vision referred to by Mr. Justice Black requires the signatories to "promote... univer-
sal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. Charter arts. 55c, 56,
59 Stat. 1046 (1945).
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became one of the bases of the decision in Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Commission.2
The state of California barred those aliens ineligible for citizenship
from obtaining a license to fish in California waters. This law was
held unconstitutional in the Takahashi case. Justice Black, speaking
for the court, based the decision on two main points. It was held
that the state's denial of an alien's right to fish was an interference
with a right granted that alien by the federal government, namely,
the right to enter and reside within the United States."3 Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, it was held a violation of the equal
protection clause to deny a fishing license to an alien merely on the
basis of his alienage. 4 The opinion stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority
thus embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in this country
shall abide 'in any state' on an equality of legal privileges with all
citizens under non-discriminatory laws.65
The court, however, did not completely close the door to distinctions
based on alienage: "for these reasons the power of a state to apply
its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined
within narrow limits."66
It is difficult to tell whether the court was primarily motivated by a
desire to end a statute designed to discriminate against the Japanese or
sought to broaden the protection given aliens by the fourteenth
amendment to cover situations where no racial discrimination was
involved. The opinion expressly avoided basing the decision solely on
racial discrimination, stating that it was not necessary to reach that
issue in order to dispose of the case.6" On its face, this would indicate a
decision on the broader ground; nevertheless, the proximity of the
Takahashi case in time and sentiment to the Oyama case cannot be
disregarded. The concurring opinions in Oyama were primarily
directed to the racially discriminatory character of the California
legislation.
In the Takahashi case the court distinguished the land law cases
62334 U.S. 410 (1948).
63 Id. at 419. The court also referred to a civil rights statute designed to give equal
rights to all person within the jurisdiction of the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 41 (1958).
See also, Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941).






from the case at bar. It stated that the land law cases represented a
state power peculiar to the land within its jurisdiction.68 It was
obvious that the court was not trying to reaffirm its prior decisions in
the land law cases, but was merely attempting to distinguish them.
Have Oyama and Takahashi materially changed the law with regard
to aliens? One point seems clear; state laws classifying aliens on the
basis of race, or tending to discriminate against aliens on the basis of
race would probably be void under the modern view. Such was the
view adopted by the California Supreme Court when it decided to
declare the California alien land law unconstitutional under the four-
teenth amendment. In Sei Fujii v. California,69 the California court
identified the state's law as one primarily designed to discriminate
against Japanese, and as such it was considered a racial discrimin-
ation, invalid under the equal protection clause."0
In spite of the Oyama and Takahashi cases, it would appear that
states will still be allowed to make classifications on the basis of
alienage, provided they can convince the court that there is a valid
purpose to be accomplished, and that the classification bears a
rational relationship to that purpose. Although the test would be the
same as before, it will probably be more stringently applied. The
court in Takahashi impliedly recognized some "narrow" grounds on
which a classification on the basis of alienage would not clash with
the constitution.71 The problem is, therefore, to determine whether or
not the Washington law would qualify to occupy this narrow ground.
The Oyama case could not be used as precedent for the invalidation
of the Washington law because the law no longer operates against one
racial group. In 1953 the Federal Immigration act was altered so that
no racial group is now barred from citizenship." Therefore, any alien,
otherwise qualified, could declare his intent, in good faith, to become
a citizen and he would thereby be fully qualified to own land in
Washington."
As noted above, the history of the Washington provision antedates
that of the California law. Washington had an alien land law as early
68 Id. at 422.
6938 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). See also Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579,
204 P.2d 569 (1949), striking down the Oregon Alien Land Law, similar to that of
California. See also State v. Oakland, 129 Mont. 347, 287 P.2d 39 (1955) striking
down the Montana Alien Land Law as violative of the fourteenth amendment.
70 For the status of the various alien land laws in the United States see, Sullivan,
Alien Land Laws-A Reevalation. 36 TEMP. L. Q. 15 (1962).
71 See discussion in text at note 66 supra.
728 U.S.C. § 1422, 1101 (1958).
73 RCW 64.16.010.
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as territorial days,7 while California's did not come into existence
until a much later date. While the California law was enacted solely
to discriminate against the Japanese,"' the Washington constitutional
provision was not designed for this purpose." Indeed, the Washington
prohibition on the ownership of land by aliens has been applied to
whites of British,77 Swiss,"8 and German"' nationalities. Therefore,
although the law enacted in 1921 to implement the constitutional pro-
vision had as its primary target the Japanese, the entire land law
history would appear to be more defensible than that of California,
insofar as it was not entirely a racially discriminatory measure. In
any event, the racial discrimination issue vis-a-vis the land law is
dead. The law now applies to all aliens who have not declared an
intention to become citizens, on an equal basis. No one group, among
those non-declarant aliens, is singled out by the operation of the law.
Therefore, the question that the court would deal with if the Wash-
ington land law were before it would be vastly different from that
involved in Oyama.
More probably, the Washington law is placed in jeopardy by the
broad statement in Takahashi that aliens, except in narrow circum-
stances, are to be placed on the same footing as citizens. Therefore,
in order to establish that the law does not deny the non-declarant
equal protection it woul seem that the state's major burden would be
in establishing a valid and reasonable purpose to be accomplished by
the law.
The state of California, in Takahashi, sought to justify its action
on the basis of an alleged special public interest in the fish found along
its coast line.80 This proposition was based on an early Supreme
Court holding to the effect that a state's citizens, collectively, own the
tide waters and the fish in them.8 The court did not attempt to
reject the argument that the state had a special interest in the fish, it
merely said: "'[O]wnership is inadequate to justify California in
excluding any or all aliens who are lawful residents of the state from
making a living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting
7
4 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
75 See, ICHIHASHI, op. cit. supra note 14, Ch. XVII.
76 See discussion in text at note 9 supra.
77 State v. O'Connell, 121 Wash. 542, 209 Pac. 865 (1922).
78 State ex rel. Tanner v. Staeheli, 112 Wash. 344, 192 Pac. 991 (1920).
7 9 Abrams v. State, 45 Wash. 327, 88 Pac. 327 (1907).8 0 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
81 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1913) ; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1895) ; McReady v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
1964]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
all others to do so."" In effect, whether or not the state owned the
fish was not material to the question at issue. In the face of this
holding would the state be able to assert a special interest in the land
lying within its jurisdiction? Doubtless the state's claim of a "special
interest" in its own territory has more substance than a claim of
interest in the fish passing through its coastal waters. One of the
classic principles of the common law is the ownership of land by the
ultimate lord, the sovereign, and the Supreme Court has not yet
attempted to revoke that doctrine. The cases recognizing a state's
special prerogative, with regard to its land, still stand.83 Therefore,
since the Washington law is no longer burdened with the albatross of
racial discrimination, it stands a far better chance of passing the
scrutiny of the court than did the California laws. A state's land
involves a matter with a vastly different historical background than
that of a state's fish resources. The State's interest in land, revered by
the common law for centuries, in the least changeable of legal fields,
might prove stubborn enough to withstand modern constitutional
attack.
Undoubtedly numerous emotional arguments could be made in an
attempt to sustain the validity of the state's interest and purpose in
maintaining the law. One may doubt the efficacy of an argument such
as "America for the Americans," if presented to the Supreme Court.
However, the argument that the law is designed to conserve the
state's land, in the face of increasing population, for those with a
permanent or lasting connection with the state might not be regarded
as unreasonable. By far the largest class affected by the Washington
law are non-resident aliens; it may be arguable that these people
would have a lesser interest in the welfare of the state than would
a citizen of Connecticut, who though absent from the state, would
have a greater interest in its welfare by virtue of the national union.
Absentee land-lordism has never been regarded as beneficial to the
land so controlled. The state does have an interest in assuring the
economically beneficial use of its land; this is one of its most import-
ant assts. If it is residential property, the state does not wish to see it
deteriorate; if it is farm land the state does not wish to see it lie
fallow. An alien residing in the state, with no intention of becoming a
82 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410, 421 (1948).
83 Cf. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat.
(17 U.S.) 453 (1819) ; Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
602 (1813).
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citizen, might not be considered to have that lasting and permanent
interest in the general welfare of the community that a state desires
of its landholders.
Doubtless the propositions posited herein are subject to attack.
They are intended only as suppositions of what the state's argument
might contain in order to establish a valid purpose for barring non-
declarant aliens from holding land within the state.
Even if the court were to uphold the Washington land law on the
basis of the old cases dealing with a state's special interest in its land,
the law would still be subject to attack on other grounds. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, in Truax v. Raich,84 the court
expressed the idea that an alien admitted to this country by the
federal government could not be denied the right to enter and reside
in any state of the union by an action of the state. It was said that a
state's denial of the right to work at ordinary employments effectively
barred that alien from residing in that state.
This argument was made and rejected in Terrace v. Thompson,85
as the court saw no substantial connection between the right to hold
an interest in land, and the right to follow ordinary modes of employ-
ment. However, the concept of the Truax case was strongly reaffirmed
in Takahashi86 and might be extended to cover the situation where an
alien was denied the right to own land. It would appear that in order
to come under the concept originally enunciated in Truax one would
have to demonstrate how the denial of land ownership interfered with
the right to pursue an ordinary line of employment. Although under
the Washington law, an alien could own certain mineral lands, and
property required to finish any of the minerals extracted from those
lands, he is nevertheless barred from owning all other types of property,
including agricultural, residential, and commercial properties."' If one
is a farmer, his pursuit of gainful employment might be severely
curtailed, and of course, a non-declarant alien could neither buy or
lease a residence for a long term. Therefore, the issue would narrow
to whether or not these restrictions constitute an interference with the
right granted the alien by Congress.
In 1953 the Washington alien land ownership provision in the
state constitution was amended in order to grant certain Canadians
84239 U.S. 33 (1915).




the right to own land in the state, regardless of whether or not they
had declared an intent to become citizens.88 The right was granted on a
recipricol basis; a Canadian from a province that allows Washing-
tonians to hold land in that province can hold land in Washington.
This change in the Washington constitution was necessitated by fears
that the Canadian provinces would retalliate against Washingtonians
because of the state's bar on the ownership of land by Canadians.89
As the law now stands all aliens who have not declared their intention
in good faith to become citizens of the United States are barred from
holding land in the state, except Canadians. This exemption for
Canadians raises some serious doubts on the continued validity of the
entire Washington law. If the equal protection formula is applied to
this new classification, the state might have a hard time showing that
equal protection was not denied. All non-declarant aliens are not
treated equally. Canadians have certain privileges denied to the alien
nationals of other sovereigns. The state would have to show that
there is a valid purpose to be accomplished by the distinction, and
that the classification used bears a rational relationship to the accom-
plishment of that purpose.9
As noted above, the Canadian exemption was designed to protect
the land holdings of Washingtonians in the Canadian provinces. From
the standpoint of the equal protection clause, this should qualify as a
valid, reasonable objective. The exempt class created would clearly
bear a logical relationship to the objective because only by allowing
Canadians to hold land could the state assure its residents that they
would qualify for reciprocal treatment by a Canadian province. The
problem does not lie with the class of those exempted, but rather with
those not exempted from the provision. The British alien is denied a
right given to the Canadian. Is there any rational basis for this distinc-
tion between Canadian and Britisher? If the state may bar all aliens
from owning land, may it further distinguish between aliens?
The state could probably point to a compelling need to exempt
Canadians, as opposed to any other national group. One point is
obvious, the geographical proximity of Canada to Washington makes
it far more likely that Washingtonians will seek to own land in Canada
rather than in Britain. Therefore, the rationality of the distinction
88 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 33; RCW 64.16.150.
89 Cross, Washington Legislation-1953, Property, 28 WASH. L. REV. 178 (1953).
90 See, McGovney, Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States,
35 CALIF. L. REv. 7 (1947) .
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would lie in the more compelling need to protect the Washingtonian's
ability to hold land in Canada. The court has rejected attacks on the
basis of a denial of equal protection on far more tenuous grounds."
However, the court, not willing to overrule the many cases recognizing
a state's special interest in its land, might, out of hostility to distinc-
tions based on alienage, be willing to find a lack of rationality in the
classification created by the Canadian exemption.
There is another possible aspect to the equal protection argument
based on the Canadian exemption; an American citizen, resident in
Washington, might be able to claim a denial of equal protection.
Should such a person hold land in a country that decided to escheat
lands held by persons whose home jurisdiction does not extend the
right to hold land to its subjects, then that Washingtonian would be at
a disadvantage compared to his neighbor who might own land in
Canada. The person owning the Canadian land is protected by the
state's law, but the one owning land in the other nation is not.
The Canadian exemption raises another constitutional issue. The
patent purpose of the exemption allowed to Canadians by the state is
to protect Washington owned lands in Canada. This action is capable
of being regarded as an attempt to conduct affairs with a foreign
sovereign, and as such might squarely conflict with the constitutional
provision vesting the authority to conduct such affairs in the Federal
government. In the Chinese Exclusion Cases, the court said: "For
local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national
purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one
people, one nation, one power.""°2
It would seem that the point is well settled that when a state seeks
to legislate in an area involving relations with foreign nations its
power is not concurrent with that of the Federal government, but
"whatever power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national
law."9 Therefore, if it is established that the Washington law does
operate in the field of foreign affairs, the next step would appear to be
an examination of federal action in this area, in order to ascertain
whether or not it conflicts with the state action. In other words, has
the Federal government superseded the state in adjusting the
91 See: Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) ; Goessaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). For a general discussion of Equal Protection doctrine
see, Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALF. L. R v. 341
(1949).
92 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
93 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941).
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privileges and protections granted to American citizens in Canada
and other foreign nations?
It would appear, in light of the pervasive network of treaties gov-
erning the rights of aliens in this country, and Americans abroad, that
the federal government has attempted to provide a complete scheme
for the adjustment of various recipricol rights. The tests for determ-
ining whether or not supercession has occurred are many and ever
changing, 4 varying from fact pattern to fact pattern. The broadest
statement of the concept is perhaps the most useful: "(The Court's)
primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of
... (the) particular case,... (the state) law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress."95
It is relatively easy to see the need for such a rule. Should the
several states attempt to play favorites among foreign nations, rival-
ries and animosities could easily arise, affecting not one state but all.
Should the British government become piqued at the special favor
granted the Canadians by the state of Washington, the animosity
would be directed against the nation as a whole, not merely the state.
Abroad, this union is regarded as a single entity; in the conduct of
international affairs the nation must act as a unified body, not 50
separate bodies acting inconsistently.96
In Clark v. Allen,9" the Supreme Court had occasion to consider a
similar argument with regard to a California law that controlled the
devolution of real property within the state. The California law
allowed alien non-residents to take by devise or operation of law on
a reciprocal basis. If the alien's nation granted the privilege to
American citizens, then the same privilege was granted to the alien.
It Was argued that this was a state extension into foreign affairs. The
court did not agree.9" It was said that California had not "entered
the forbidden domain of negotiating with a foreign country... ."' The
94Id. at 67. See also Sullivan, op. cit. supra note 11.
95 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
96 The enactment of the California anti-Japanese land law gives an excellent ex-
ample of the international repurcussions that may result when states legislate in a field
that may have international ramifications. In 1913 mobs swept the streets of Tokyo
in protest to the activity then in progress in the California legislature with reference
to the Alien Land Law. Demands were made by these mobs for reprisal against the
United States. The passage of the land law was an important factor in the creation
of anti-American societies in Japan. See: McWILLIAMS, PREJUDICE 46 (1944).
7 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
98 Id. at 517.
99 Ibid.
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effect of the California law on the United States foreign relations was
viewed as remote, and indirect, and thus the court did not consider it
a meddling in forbidden territory.?°
The Washington law bears a striking difference from the California
law. The California law purported to grant the reciprocal rights to
all nations, the Washington law singles out only one nation for fav-
ored treatment. California did not seek to adjust relations with any
particular foreign power, while Washington's law was specifically
designed for that purpose. In light of this distinction it would appear
plausible that the two cases are readily distinguishable.
Although the Washington law remains on the books, this writer
has learned from interested parties that it is no longer being enforced.
It is rumored that aliens currently hold land in Washington, in their
own names, without employing any of the available devices for evad-
ing the law. This situation bodes ill for a constitutional test of the
law. With no person being adversely affected in a real and palpable
sense by the law, the federal courts might be prone to regard any
attempted test as premature. 101
THODORE ROODNER
100 For a discussion of the international effect of the various alien land laws see,
Sullivan, Alien Land Laws-A Reevaluation, 36 TEmP. L.Q. 15, 42 (1962) ; see also
discussion in note 96 mipra.
101 In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), the Connecticut birth control law was
attacked as being unconstitutional. The case was dismissed partly because the court
was not convinced that the law was being enforced so as to actually impair any rights
of the petitioner.
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